

# ConScript


Specifying and Enforcing Fine-Grained Security Policies  
for JavaScript in the Browser

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Microsoft®  
**Research**



# Complications



**Benign but buggy:**  
**who is to blame?**

**Code constantly  
evolving**  
**How do we maintain  
quality?**


**Downright malicious**  
**Prototype hijacking**

# Developer's Dilemma



Mashups mean  
including code

Other people's  
code can't be  
trusted



# Only Allow **eval** of JSON

- Idea for a policy:
  - Parse input strings instead of running them
  - Use ConScript to *advise* **eval** calls
- AspectJ advice for Java

```
void around call Window::eval (String s) { ... }
```

- How to do advice in JavaScript?
  - No classes to speak of

# Only Allow `eval` of JSON

```
eval("xhr.open('evil.com');)")
```




```
eval("[{'hello': 'Oakland'}, 2010])")
```




# Advising Calls is Tricky

```
window.eval = function allowJSON() { ... }
```




# Advising Calls is Tricky

```
window.eval = function allowJSON() { ... }
```




# Advising Calls is Tricky

```
window.eval = function allowJSON() { ... }
```



## ConScript approach

- Deep advice for complete mediation
- Implemented within the browser for efficiency and reliability



# Example of Applying Advice in ConScript

```
1. <SCRIPT SRC="facebook.js" POLICY="
2.     var substr = String.prototype.substring;
3.     var parse = JSON.parse;
4.     around(window.eval,
5.         function(oldEval, str) {
6.             var str2 = uCall(str, substr, 1,
7.                             str.length - 1);
8.             var res = parse(str2);
9.             if (res) return res;
10.            else throw "eval only for JSON";
11.        } );">
```

# Contributions of ConScript

## A case for aspects in browser

- Protect benign users by giving control to hosting site
- ConScript approach: browser-supported aspects

## Correctness checking

- Policies are easy to get wrong
- Type system to ensure policy correctness

## Expressiveness

- Wide catalog of policies from literature and practice
- 17 concise hand-written policies
- Implemented 2 policy generators

## Real-world Evaluation

- Built into IE8 JavaScript interpreter
- Tested on real apps: Google Maps, Live Desktop, etc.
- Runtime and space overheads under 1% (vs. 30-550%)

A case for aspects  
in browser

Implementation


Correctness  
checking

Expressiveness

Real-world  
Evaluation

# Advising JavaScript Functions in IE8

```
around (paint, withBoundChecks) ;  
dog.draw();  
fish.display();
```



# This is Just the Beginning...

- Not just JavaScript functions
  - native JavaScript calls: `Math.round`, ...
  - DOM calls: `document.getElementById`, ...
- Not just functions...
  - script introduction
  - ...
- Optimizations
  - Blessing
  - Auto-blessing

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Type system

# Policies are Easy to Get Wrong

```
1. var okOrigin={"http://www.google.com":true};  
2. around(window.postMessage,  
3. function (post, msg, target) {  
4.     if (!okOrigin[target]) {  
5.         throw 'err';  
6.     } else {  
7.         return post.call(this, msg, target);  
8.     }  
9. });
```

# Policies are Easy to Get Wrong

toString redefinition!

```
1. 
2. around(window, String.prototype);
3.   function (post, target) {
4.     if (!okOrigin[target])
5.       throw 'error';
6.     } else {
7.       return target[post].call(this, msg, target);
8.     }
9. 
```

Function.prototype  
poisoning!

Object.prototype  
poisoning!

# How Do We Enforce Policy Correctness?

- | <b>Application code</b>  | <b>Policy code</b>   |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Unperturbed usage of legacy code</li><li>• Disallow <code>arguments.caller</code> to avoid stack inspection<br/><br/>(disallowed by ES5's strict mode)</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Modify the JavaScript interpreter<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– introduce <code>uCall</code>, <code>hasProp</code>, and <code>toPrimitive</code></li><li>– disable <code>eval</code></li></ul></li><li>• Propose a type system to enforce correct use of these primitives<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– disable <code>with</code>, ...</li></ul></li></ul> |

# Policy Type System

- ML-like type system
- Uses security labels to denote privilege levels
- Enforces *access path integrity* and *reference isolation*

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash o : (f : T^L; r)^\circ \quad \Gamma \vdash v : T^L}{\Gamma \vdash o.f = v : T^L} \quad (\text{k stat set})$$

# Policy Type System

## Reference isolation

- $o$  does not leak through poisoning if  $f$  is a field
- Enforcement of *reference isolation* with *integrity* and *reference isolation*

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash o : (f : T^L; r)^\circ \quad \Gamma \vdash v : T^L}{\Gamma \vdash o.f = v : T^L} \text{ (k stat set)}$$

## Access path integrity for function calls

- $o.f$  remains unpoisoned if  $T$  in  $v : T$  is not poisoned

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Policies

# ConScript Policies

- **17 hand-written policies**
  - Diverse: based on literature, bugs, and anti-patterns
  - Short: wrote new HTML tags *with only a few lines of code*
- **2 automatic policy generators**
  - Using runtime analysis
  - Using static analysis

**Paper  
presents**

**17**

**ConScript  
Policies**

The diagram features a central title "Paper presents 17 ConScript Policies" surrounded by 17 rounded rectangular boxes, each containing a policy name. The policies are color-coded: green for manifest of script URLs, blue for HTTP-only cookies and resource blacklists, purple for no pop-ups, limit eval, no foreign links, and no dynamic IFRAME creation, and light blue for <noscript>, script whitelist, and no URL redirection.

enforce public  
vs. private

manifest of  
script URLs

HTTP-only  
cookies

no pop-ups

resource  
blacklists

no URL  
redirection

limit eval

<noscript>

no foreign links

script whitelist

no dynamic  
IFRAME creation

# Paper presents

```
around(document.createElement,
  function (c : K, tag : U) {
    var elt : U = uCall(document, c, tag);
    if (elt.nodeName == "IFRAME") throw 'err';
    else return elt; });

  } catch (e) {
    if (e.name != "SecurityError") throw e;
  }
}
```

<noscript>

script whitelist

no dynamic  
IFRAME creation

no foreign links

no pop-ups


resource  
blacklists

enforce public  
vs. private

manifest of  
script URLs



HTTP-only  
cookies

# Generating Intrusion Detection Policies



# Enforcing C# Access Modifiers

```
class File {  
    public File () { ... }  
    private open () { ... }  
    ...
```





```
function File () { ... }  
File.construct = ...  
File.open = ...  
...
```



# Enforcing C# Access Modifiers

```
class File {  
    public File () { ... }  
    private open () { ... }  
    ...
```





Script# compiler

```
function File () { ... }  
File.construct = ...  
File.open = ...  
...
```




# Enforcing C# Access Modifiers

```
class File {  
    public File () { ... }  
    private open () { ... }  
    ...
```



Script# compiler

```
function File () { ... }  
File.construct = ...  
File.open = ...  
...
```



```
around(File, pubEntryPoint);  
around(File.construct, pubEntryPoint);  
around(File.open, privCall);
```

ConScript



A case for aspects  
in browser

Correctness  
checking

Expressiveness

Real-world  
Evaluation

Evaluation

# Experimental Evaluation

## Low adoption barrier

- Implemented on top of the IE 8 JavaScript interpreter
- TCB increase: under 1,000 lines added to IE8's JavaScript engine
- Changed a few language constructs to disallow `arguments.caller`


## Micro-benchmarks

- Function, DOM call, eval overhead
- 2.5x faster than previously published source-level wrapping
- Advice optimizations make it faster still

## Macro-benchmarks


- Google Maps, MSN, Gmail, Live Desktop, Google Calendar
- Hundreds of KB of JavaScript code
- Runtime overhead due to ConScript advice: mostly under 1%
- File size increase due to ConScript advice: under 1%

# DoCoMo Policy Enforcement Overhead



H. Kikuchi, D. Yu, A. Chander, H. Inamura, and I. Serikov,  
“JavaScript instrumentation in practice,” 2008

# File Size Increase for Blacklisting Policy



# Conclusions

A case for aspects  
in browser

- To provide reliable enforcement, browser changes are required and can be minimal

Correctness  
checking

- Previous attempts illustrate that hand-written policies are buggy. ConScript addresses this with a type system without affecting legacy code

Expressiveness


- Provide a catalog of 17 hand-written policies for other researchers to use and show how policies can be generated by translators like Script#

Real-world  
Evaluation


- Implementing policy enforcement in the browser and not at the source level has tremendous performance advantages

# **QUESTIONS?**

# Mediating DOM Functions




# Resuming Calls



**bless()** temporarily disables advice for next call

# Optimizing the Critical Path



- calling advice turns advice off for next call
- `curse()` enables advice for next call